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Abstract 
Integrating objects with their context is a key step in the interpretation of complex visual scenes. 
Humans can do this very quickly, yet the brain mechanisms that mediate this ability are not yet 
understood. Here, we used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to measure brain 
activity while participants viewed visual scenes depicting a person performing an action with an 
object that was either congruent or incongruent with the scene. Univariate and multivariate 
analyses revealed different activity for congruent compared to incongruent scenes in the lateral 
occipital complex, inferior temporal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and prefrontal cortex, in 
line with existing models of scene processing. Importantly, and in contrast to previous studies, 
these activations could not be explained by task-induced conflicts. A secondary goal of this study 
was to examine whether object-context integration could occur in the absence of awareness, by 
comparing brain activity elicited by congruent vs. incongruent scenes that were suppressed from 
awareness using visual masking. We found no evidence for brain activity differentiating between 
congruent and incongruent invisible scenes. Overall, our results provide novel support for the 
roles of PHC and PFC in conscious object-context integration which cannot be explained by 
either low-level differences or task demands. Yet they further suggest that activity in these 
regions is decreased by visual masking to the point of becoming undetectable with our fMRI 
protocol.   
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1. Introduction 
A very short glimpse of a visual scene often suffices to identify objects, and understand 
their relations with one another, as well as with the context in which they appear. The co-
occurrence of objects within specific scenes or contexts (Bar, 2004) gives rise to expectations 
about their relations. When these expectations are violated (Biederman, Mezzanotte, & 
Rabinowitz, 1982), object and scene processing are impaired - both with respect to speed (e.g., 
Davenport & Potter, 2004; Palmer, 1975; Rieger, Kochy, Schalk, Gruschow, & Heinze, 2008) 
and to accuracy (e.g., Biederman, Rabinowitz, Glass, & Stacy, 1974; Boyce, Pollatsek, & 
Rayner, 1989; Underwood, 2005), suggesting that contextual expectation may have an important 
role in scene and object processing (Bar, 2004; Mudrik, Lamy, & Deouell, 2010; Oliva & 
Torralba, 2007; though see Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999). 
Yet despite the proclaimed role of object-context integration in scene comprehension, its 
underlying mechanisms are still unclear. At the neural level, an interplay between frontal and 
temporal visual areas has been suggested (Bar, 2003, 2004; see also Trapp & Bar, 2015), so that 
after identifying the scene’s gist, high-level contextual expectations about scene-congruent 
objects are compared with upcoming visual information about objects’ features, until a match is 
found and the objects are identified (for electrophysiological support, see Dyck & Brodeur, 
2015; Mudrik et al., 2010; Mudrik, Lamy, Shalgi, & Deouell, 2014; Võ & Wolfe, 2013; though 
see Ganis & Kutas, 2003; Demiral et al., 2012). However, these suggestions are mostly based on 
studies that did not directly examine the processing of objects in scenes, but rather used other 
ways to probe contextual processing (e.g., comparing objects that evoke strong vs. weak 
contextual associations (Kveraga et al., 2011), or manipulating the relations between two isolated 
objects (Gronau, Neta, & Bar, 2008; Kaiser, Stein, & Peelen, 2014)). Critically, the few papers 
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that did focus on objects within real life scenes (Jenkins, Yang, Goh, Hong, & Park, 2010; Kirk, 
2008; Rémy, Vayssière, Saint-Aubert, Barbeau, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2013) report conflicting 
findings and interpretations about the role of frontotemporal regions - more specifically the 
prefrontal cortex and the medial temporal lobe (MTL) - for object-context integration. The 
prefrontal cortex was repeatedly implicated in semantic processing of different types (e.g., Gold 
et al., 2006; Gronau et al., 2008; Kveraga et al., 2011; van Kesteren, Rijpkema, Ruiter, & 
Fernández, 2010), even when directly manipulating object-scene relations (Rémy et al., 2013). 
Yet it was suggested that this may reflect task-induced conflict rather than object-context 
integration per se (Rémy et al., 2013). Likewise, the literature is divided about the role of the 
MTL in object-context integration, especially regarding the parahippocampal cortex (PHC; for 
review of findings, see Malcolm, Groen, & Baker, 2016). Some claim that the PHC processes 
contextual associations (Aminoff, Kveraga, & Bar, 2013; Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Montaldi et al., 
1998; Rémy et al., 2013; see also Goh et al., 2004, who reported PHC and hippocampal 
activations for contextual binding between objects and scenes, and Stansbury et al. (2013) who 
gave an account of PHC activity in terms of statistical learning of object co-occurrences). Others 
argue that it processes spatial layouts (Epstein, 2008; Epstein & Ward, 2009) or representations 
of three-dimensional local spaces, even of a single object (Mullally & Maguire, 2011), 
irrespective of contextual associations (see also Howard, Kumaran, Ólafsdóttir, & Spiers, 2011).  
The cognitive characteristics of object-context integration are no better agreed upon than 
its neural mechanisms. For instance, the necessary conditions for such integrative processes are 
still under dispute. One aspect of this dispute, which is at the focus of the current research, 
concerns the role of conscious perception in object-context integration. Using behavioral 
measures, two studies suggested that integration can occur even when subjects are unaware of 
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both objects and the scenes in which they appear (Mudrik, Breska, Lamy, & Deouell, 2011; 
Mudrik & Koch, 2013; see also Stein, Kaiser, & Peelen, 2015, for prioritized access to awareness 
of interacting vs. non-interacting objects). This result is in line with the unconscious binding 
hypothesis (Lin & He, 2009), according to which the brain can associate, group or bind certain 
features in invisible scenes, especially when these features are dominant (for a discussion of 
conscious vs. unconscious integration, see Mudrik, Faivre, & Koch, 2014). However, a recent 
attempt to replicate these findings has failed (Moors, Boelens, van Overwalle, & Wagemans, 
2016; Kataev & Mudrik, under review). The absence of unconscious object-context integration 
would be in line with theories that tie integration with consciousness (Global Workspace Theory, 
Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Integrated Information Theory, 
Tononi, Boly, Massimini, & Koch, 2016; Tononi & Edelman, 1998). While the jury is still out 
on this question, our study aimed at measuring the brain activity mediating unconscious object-
context integration - if indeed such integration is possible in the absence of awareness.  
The goals of the current study were thus twofold; at the neural level, we aimed at 
identifying the neural substrates of object-context integration, and specifically at testing whether 
frontal activations indeed reflect contextual processing rather than task-related conflicts (Rémy 
et al., 2013). At the cognitive level, we looked for evidence of unconscious object-context 
integration while carefully controlling visibility, and aimed at identifying the neural substrates of 
unconscious integration. Subjects were thus scanned as they were presented with masked visual 
scenes depicting a person performing an action with a congruent (e.g., a man drinking from a 
bottle) or an incongruent (e.g., a man drinking from a flashlight) object (see Figure 1). The 
experiment had two conditions: one in which scenes were clearly visible (visible condition), and 
one in which they were not (invisible condition). Stimulus visibility was manipulated by 
. CC-BY-NC 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/116111doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Mar. 12, 2017; 
changing masking parameters while keeping stimulus energy constant. Participants rated 
stimulus visibility on each trial; they did not perform any object-context congruency or object-
identification judgments, to ensure that the measured brain activations could be attributed to 
object-context integration per se, and not to task-induced conflict (Rémy et al., 2013). 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
Eighteen participants (eight females, mean age = 25.1 years, SD = 4.32 years) from the student 
population of the California Institute of Technology took part in this study for payment ($50 per 
hour). All participants were right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no 
psychiatric or neurological history. The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review 
Board committee of the California Institute of Technology, and informed consent was obtained 
after the experimental procedures were explained to the subjects. Two additional participants had 
too few invisible trials in the invisible condition (less than 70% of trials), and were excluded 
from the analysis.  
 
2.2 Apparatus and stimuli 
Stimuli were back-projected onto a screen that was visible to subjects via a mirror attached to the 
head coil, using a video projector (refresh rate 60 Hz, resolution 1280 x 1024). Stimuli were 
controlled from a PC computer running Matlab with the Psychophysics Toolbox version 3 
(Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). Responses were collected with two fiber optic 
response devices (Current Designs, Philadelphia, USA). Target images were 6.38° by 4.63° (369 
x 268 pixels) color pictures of a person performing an action with an object. In the congruent 
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condition, the object was congruent with the performed action (e.g., a woman drinking from a 
cup), while in the incongruent condition, it was not (e.g., a woman drinking from a plant; see 
Mudrik, Deouell, & Lamy, 2011; Mudrik & Koch, 2013 for details). In both types of images, the 
critical object was pasted onto the scene. Low-level differences in saliency, chromaticity, and 
spatial frequency were controlled for during the creation of the stimulus set (Mudrik et al., 2010), 
and tested using an objective perceptual model (Neumann & Gegenfurtner, 2006). Visual masks 
were generated from a different set of scenes, by cutting each scene image into 5 x 6 tiles and 
then randomly shuffling the tiles.  
     
2.3 Procedure 
The experiment was run over two separate one-hour scanning sessions. During the anatomical 
scan at the beginning of the first session, subjects performed a simple discrimination task 
designed to individually adjust the contrasts of the masks and targets, thus ensuring a comparable 
depth of suppression across subjects in the invisible condition. 72 images (half congruent, half 
incongruent; all different from the ones used in the main experiment) were presented, either 
upright or inverted (pseudo-randomly intermixed, with the constraint that the same image 
orientation was never presented in four consecutive trials). Subjects indicated for each trial 
whether the image was upright or inverted, and rated its visibility subjectively using the 
Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS; Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004), where 1 signifies ‘‘I didn’t see 
anything,’’ 2 stands for ‘‘I had a vague perception of something,’’ 3 represents ‘‘I saw a clear 
part of the image,’’ and 4 is ‘‘I saw the entire image clearly.’’ Subjects were instructed to guess 
the orientation if they did not see the image. Initial mask (Michelson) contrast was 0.85, and 
initial prime contrast was 0.7. Following correct responses (i.e., correct classification of the 
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image orientation as upright or inverted), mask contrast was increased by 0.05, and following 
incorrect responses, it was decreased by 0.05 (i.e., 1-up, 1-down staircase procedure, Levitt, 
1971). If mask contrast reached 1, target contrast was decreased by steps of 0.05, stopping at the 
minimum allowable contrast of 0.15. In the main experiment, mask contrast was then set to the 
second highest level reached during the calibration session (or, if mask contrast reached 1, it was 
set to 1) and target contrast was set to the second lowest level reached. Mask contrast reached 1 
for all subjects. Average target contrast was 0.39 ± 0.05 (here and elsewhere, ± denotes 95% 
confidence interval). The same contrasts were used in both visible and invisible conditions in the 
main experiment, so stimulus energy entering the system would be matched. 
 
The invisible condition followed the calibration in the first session. The visible condition was 
conducted in the second session, so the results in the invisible condition would not be biased by 
previous conscious exposure. The invisible and visible conditions were each divided into four 
runs of 90 trials, of which 72 contained either congruent or incongruent target images, and 18 
had no stimuli (i.e., “catch trials”), serving as baseline. The order of congruent and incongruent 
trials within a run was optimized using a genetic algorithm (Wager & Nichols, 2003) with the 
constraint that a run could not start with a baseline trial, and that two baseline trials could not 
occur in succession. Each trial started with a fixation cross presented for 200 ms, followed by 
three repeats of a sequence of target images and masks, and then a judgment of image visibility 
using the PAS. The sequence started with two forward masks (each presented for 50 ms, with a 
17 ms blank interval), followed by the target image (33 ms), and two backward masks (50 ms 
each, 17 ms blank interval). The only difference between the invisible condition (first session) 
and the visible condition (second session) lied in the duration of the intervals immediately 
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preceding and immediately following the target image: a 17ms gap was used in the invisible 
session, while a 50 to 200 ms gap (randomly selected on each trial from a uniform distribution) 
was used in the visible session. To equate the overall energy of a trial across conditions, the final 
fixation in the sequence lasted between 100 and 400 ms in the invisible session. A random 
number of masks (0-4) were presented between repetitions of the sequence in each trial, to 
minimize predictability of the onset of the target image (Figure 1). A random inter-trial interval 
(uniform distribution between 1 and 3s) was enforced between trials, so that on average a whole 
trial lasted 4.5 s.  
 
At the end of the invisible session, two objective performance tasks were run in the 
scanner: 1) a congruency task, in which subjects were asked to determine if a scene was 
congruent or not and 2) an orientation task, in which half the images were upright and half were 
inverted, and subjects were asked to determine their orientation. In both tasks, the same trial 
structure as the one used in the main experiment was used; subjects were instructed to guess if 
they did not know the answer. Subjects also rated image visibility using the PAS, after each trial. 
At the end of the visible session, subjects participated in two runs of a block design 
paradigm to localize brain regions that respond differentially to congruent and incongruent 
scenes. Each consisted of 18 blocks of 12 images, which were either all congruent or all 
incongruent scenes. Blocks started with a 5-7 s fixation cross. Then, the 12 images were 
presented successively for 830 ms each, with a 190 ms blank between images. Subjects had to 
detect when an image was repeated, which occurred once per block (1-back task).  
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Figure 1. Experimental procedure. The left column depicts the different runs and their order 
(calibration, invisible session, visibility tests, visible session and localizer). On the right, the 
experimental sequence in the main runs (top) and the two post-test visibility runs (bottom). In 
all trials, one experimental sequence was repeated three times, separated by 0-4 masks to 
avoid temporal predictability of the target image. The experimental trials ended with only one 
question about target visibility. In the post-test trials, this subjective visibility question was 
preceded by an objective question (about target congruency/orientation). Each experimental 
sequence included one presentation of the target scene, which was either congruent or 
incongruent, and five masks which either immediately followed and preceded the scene 
(invisible condition) or were separated from it by blanks (visible condition). Thus, throughout 
each trial, the target scene was presented three times.   
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2.4 Behavioral data analysis 
All analyses were performed with R (2016), using the BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder 2015), and 
ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) packages. 
 
2.5 MRI data acquisition and preprocessing 
All images were acquired using a 3 Tesla whole-body MRI system (Magnetom Tim Trio, 
Siemens Medical Solutions) with a 32-channel head receive array, at the Caltech Brain Imaging 
Center. Functional blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) images were acquired with T2*-
weighted gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) (TR/TE = 2500/30 ms, flip angle = 80°, 3mm 
isotropic voxels and 46 slices acquired in an interleaved fashion, covering the whole brain). 
Anatomical reference images were acquired using a high-resolution T1-weighted sequence 
(MPRAGE, TR/TE/TI = 1500/2.74/800 ms, flip angle = 10°, 1mm isotropic voxels).  
The functional images were processed using the SPM8 toolbox (Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) for Matlab. The three first volumes of each run were 
discarded to eliminate nonequilibrium effects of magnetization. Preprocessing steps included 
temporal high-pass filtering (1/128 Hz), rigid-body motion correction and slice-timing correction 
(middle reference slice). Functional images were co-registered to the subject’s own T1-weighted 
anatomical image. The T1-weighted anatomical image was segmented into gray matter, white 
matter and cerebrospinal fluid, and nonlinearly registered to the standard Montreal Neurological 
Institute space (MNI152). The same spatial normalization parameters were applied to the 
functional images, followed by spatial smoothing (using a Gaussian kernel with 12 mm full-
width at half maximum) for group analysis. Scans with large signal variations (i.e., more than 
1.5% difference from the mean global intensity) or scans with more than 0.5 mm/TR scan-to-
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scan motion were repaired by interpolating the nearest non-repaired scans using the ArtRepair 
toolbox (Mazaika, Whitfield, & Cooper, 2005).  
 
2.6 fMRI analysis 
Statistical analyses relied on the classical general linear model (GLM) framework. For univariate 
analyses, models included one regressor for congruent, one regressor for incongruent, and one 
regressor for baseline trials in each run. Each regressor consisted in delta functions 
corresponding to trial onset times, convolved with the double gamma canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF). Time and dispersion derivatives were added to account for variability 
of the HRF across brain areas and subjects. Motion parameters from the rigid-body realignment 
were added as covariates of no interest (6 regressors). Individual-level analyses investigated the 
contrast between the congruent vs. the incongruent condition. Group-level statistics were derived 
by submitting individual contrasts to a one sample two-tailed t-test. We adopted a cluster-level 
thresholding with p < 0.05 after FWE correction, or uncorrected threshold with p < 0.001 and a 
minimal cluster extent of 10 voxels. Note that our results did not resist correction for multiple 
comparisons after threshold free cluster enhancement (TFCE; Smith & Nichols, 2009). The 
functional localizer followed the same preprocessing and analysis steps as the main experimental 
runs. We defined regions of interest (ROIs) based on the results from the functional localizer: we 
centered spheres of 12 mm radius on the peak activity of each cluster of more than five 
contiguous voxels in the group-level SPM (voxel-wise threshold p < 0.001, uncorrected). For 
multivariate analyses, each run was subdivided into four mini-runs, each containing nine 
congruent and nine incongruent trials. One regressor was defined for congruent and incongruent 
trials in each mini-run. No time or dispersion derivative was used for these models, and no 
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spatial smoothing was applied. The individual beta estimates of each mini-run were used for 
classification. Beta estimates of each voxel within the ROIs defined above were extracted and 
used to train a linear Support Vector Machine (using the libsvm toolbox for Matlab, 
http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/cjlin/libsvm) to classify mini-runs into those with congruent and 
incongruent object-context relations. A leave-one-run-out cross-validation scheme was used. 
Statistical significance of group-level classification performances was assessed using Bayes 
Factor and permutation-based information prevalence inference to compare global vs. majority 
null hypotheses (Allefeld, Görgen, & Haynes, 2016). 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Behavioral data 
In the visible condition, subjects’ visibility ratings indicated that target images were partly or 
clearly perceived (visibility 1: 3.5% ± 3.0%; visibility 2:  18.5% ± 7.5%; visibility 3: 37.8% ± 
5.4%; visibility 4: 45.4% ± 9.4%). Only trials with visibility ratings of 3 or 4 were kept for 
further analyses. By contrast, in the invisible condition, subjective visibility of target images was 
dramatically reduced due to masking (visibility 1: 56.6% ± 12.2%; visibility 2:  31.2% ± 7.1%; 
visibility 3: 14.3% ± 7.8%; visibility 4: 0.1% ± 0.04%) (Figure 2a). Only trials with visibility 
ratings of 1 or 2 were kept for further analyses (for a similar approach, see Melloni, Schwiedrzik, 
Müller, Rodriguez, & Singer, 2011). Objective performance for discriminating scene congruency 
in corresponding visibility ratings in the invisible condition did not significantly differ from 
chance-level (51.6 % ± 2.5%, t(15) = 1.24, p = 0.23,  BF = 0.49, indicating that H0 was two 
times more likely than H1) (Figure 2b). However, objective performance for discriminating 
upright vs. inverted scenes was slightly above chance-level (56.0 % ± 4.4%, t(16) = 2.64, p = 
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0.02,  BF = 3.3, indicating that H1 was around three times more likely than H0; regrettably, two 
subjects did not complete the objective tasks due to technical issues). This suggests some level of 
partial awareness, in which some participants could discriminate low-level properties of the 
natural scene such as its vertical orientation, but not its semantic content (Gelbard-Sagiv, Faivre, 
Mudrik, & Koch, 2016; Kouider & Dupoux, 2004). In all following results, unconscious 
processing is therefore defined with respect to scene congruency, and not to the target images 
themselves of which subjects might have been partially aware, at least in some trials.  
 
 
Figure 2. Behavioral results. 2a. Average distributions of subjective ratings in the visible 
and invisible conditions. In the visible condition, only trials in which participants 
reported seeing a clear part or the entire image were selected for analysis. In the 
invisible condition, these trials were excluded, while those in which nothing or a vague 
glimpse was perceived were kept. 2b. Objective performance for discriminating 
upright/inverted scenes (left panel) and congruent/incongruent scenes (right panel) in the 
invisible condition. Each circle represents individual performance in one category of 
subjective visibility. The size of each circle represents the number of trials from which 
individual performance was computed.  
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3.2 Imaging data 
3.2.1. Univariate analyses 
The set of brain regions involved in the processing of scene congruency was identified with a 
functional localizer contrasting activity elicited by congruent vs. incongruent blocks of target 
images (no masking, see Methods). At the group level, this contrast revealed a set of regions in 
which activity was weaker for congruent than incongruent images. Significant activations (for 
cluster-level thresholding with p < 0.05 after FWE correction, or uncorrected threshold with p < 
0.001 and a minimal cluster extent of 10 voxels) in the temporal lobe comprised the right inferior 
temporal and fusiform gyri, the left middle temporal gyrus, and the right parahippocampal gyrus 
including the parahippocampal place area. In the parietal lobe, activations were detected in the 
bilateral cunei, the right parietal lobule, and the left paracentral lobule. In the frontal lobe, 
significant clusters were observed in the bilateral inferior frontal gyri, right middle frontal gyrus, 
left superior medial frontal gyrus, and left cingulate gyrus.  
We then used results from the localizer as a mask when contrasting activity elicited by 
congruent vs. incongruent target images during the visible condition in the main experimental 
runs (see Figure 3 and Table 2). Significant activations were found bilaterally in the fusiform, 
cingulate, middle and inferior frontal gyri, inferior parietal lobules, precunei, insular cortices, 
and caudate bodies; as well as activations in the left hemisphere, including the left inferior and 
superior temporal gyri, and left medial frontal gyrus (see Table 2).  
When contrasting activity elicited by congruent vs. incongruent target images in the 
invisible condition, no significant result was found with the same uncorrected threshold of p < 
0.001. We verified that the images did elicit a response in visual cortices irrespective of their 
congruency, by contrasting both congruent and incongruent trials with the baseline condition in 
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which no target image was shown (see figure SI1). Thus, masking was not so strong as to 
completely prevent low-level visual processing of the target images.  
 
Figure 3. T-maps for the comparison of congruent vs. incongruent images during the 
functional localizer and visible condition (p < 0.001, uncorrected; see tables for corrected 
p-values). The right panel shows the overlap of t-values between the localizer (in red) and 
visible condition (in yellow). Activations in regions which were not identified with the 
localizer run included the following areas: in the right hemisphere, the inferior occipital, 
medial and superior frontal, and orbital gyri. In the left hemisphere – the superior and 
middle occipital, parahippocampal, fusiform, inferior temporal, supramarginal, and 
middle frontal gyri, as well as the inferior parietal lobule, posterior cingulate cortex, and 
caudate body.  
 
** Please insert Table 1 here ** 
Table 1: Cluster extent (CE), statistical values, and MNI stereotaxic brain atlas 
coordinates for the brain regions more activated by incongruent vs. congruent target 
images during the functional localizer.  
 
** Please insert Table 2 here ** 
Table 2: Cluster extent (CE), statistical values, and MNI stereotaxic brain atlas 
coordinates for the brain regions more activated by incongruent vs. congruent target 
images during the main task in the visible condition. 
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3.2.2. Multivariate analyses 
We then investigated whether the activity patterns extracted from spheres centered on the 
clusters identified in the functional localizer conveyed additional information regarding scene 
congruency. In the visible condition, we could decode scene congruency from the spheres 
located in the right fusiform gyrus, right superior parietal lobule, middle and inferior frontal 
gyrus, left precuneus, left superior medial and inferior frontal gyrus, and left anterior cingulate 
cortex. (Figure 4, Table 3). In the invisible condition, on the other hand, we could not decode 
congruency above chance in any of the spherical ROIs, with a statistical significance threshold of 
p < 0.05 for the global and majority null hypotheses (see Methods). Bayesian analyses revealed 
that our results in the invisible condition were inconclusive: evidence was lacking in our data to 
support the null hypothesis (i.e., log(⅓) < log(BF) > log(3), see Figure 4). 
 
** Please insert Table 3 here ** 
Table 3: Average decoding performance, p-values for the global and majority null 
hypotheses (permutation-based information prevalence inference), logarithm of Bayes 
factors in the visible condition in the main task, and MNI stereotaxic brain atlas 
coordinates for the spheres centered on brain regions defined in the functional localizer. 
The majority null hypothesis was rejected at a threshold p<0.05 only in the left middle 
and inferior frontal gyri, suggesting that decoding was possible in a majority of 
participants in these brain regions.  
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Figure 4. Logarithm of Bayes factor corresponding to decoding performances in the 
visible (y-axis) and invisible (x-axis) conditions, in the spherical ROIs where significant 
decoding was found in the visible condition. Dashed lines represent values below which 
the null hypothesis is favored (horizontal and vertical intercepts of log(⅓)), and above 
which the null hypothesis can be rejected (horizontal and vertical intercepts of log(3)). 
Note that all results in the invisible condition lay in the “gray zone” where the null 
hypothesis can neither be supported or rejected, suggesting inconclusive data; while most 
areas are above the dashed line in the visible condition, where the null hypothesis is 
rejected.  
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4. Discussion 
The current study aimed at determining the neural substrates of object-context integration that 
are recruited irrespective of a specific task or instruction, and assessing the existence of object-
context integration even when subjects are unaware of the presented scenes. While for the first 
question an extensive network of areas engaged in object-context integration was identified – 
overcoming possible previous confounds induced by task demands or low-level features of the 
stimuli - the answer to the second question was negative, as we were unable to detect any neural 
activity which differentiated between congruent and incongruent scenes in the invisible 
condition. We discuss both of these findings below. 
 
4.1. Neural correlates of object-context integration 
In line with previous studies, several areas were found when contrasting activations induced by 
congruent vs. incongruent images. A prominent group of visual areas were identified: the inferior 
temporal gyrus, suggested by Bar (Bar, 2004; see also Trapp & Bar, 2015) as the locus of 
contextually-guided object recognition, and the fusiform gyrus, previously implicated also in 
associative processing (e.g., Hawco & Lepage, 2014). The fusiform gyrus comprises the lateral 
occipital complex (LOC), previously reported to differentiate between semantically related and 
unrelated objects (e.g., Kim & Biederman, 2010; see also Gronau et al., 2008). Interestingly, in a 
recent study which also presented congruent and incongruent scenes (Rémy et al., 2013), the 
LOC did not show stronger activity for incongruent images but only responded to animal vs. 
non-animal objects, irrespective of the scene in which they appeared. Possibly, this discrepancy 
could be explained by a difference in stimuli. All of our scenes portray a person performing an 
action with an object, so that object identity is strongly constrained by the scene (the number of 
. CC-BY-NC 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/116111doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Mar. 12, 2017; 
possible objects which are congruent with the scene is very small; e.g., a person can only drink 
from a limited set of objects). In most previous studies, on the other hand, including that of 
Remy and colleagues, the scene is a location (e.g., a street, the beach, a living room), in which 
many objects could potentially appear. Potentially then, the stronger manipulation of congruency 
induced by our stimuli elicited wider activations.   
Our results also support the role of the parahippocampal cortex (PHC) in processing 
contextual associations (Aminoff et al., 2013; Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Baumann & Mattingley, 
2016; Gronau et al., 2008; Montaldi et al., 1998; Rémy et al., 2013; see also Aminoff, Gronau, & 
Bar, 2007) rather than - or at least in addition to - spatial layouts (Epstein, 2008; Epstein & 
Ward, 2009; Mullally & Maguire, 2011). Indeed, the PHC showed greater activity for 
incongruent vs. congruent images, though all scenes were identical in spatial layout, aside from 
the congruent/incongruent object that was pasted onto them. Furthermore, our study overcomes 
another, more specific possible confound (see Rémy et al., 2013, for discussion), which relates to 
spatial frequencies. The latter were found to modulate PHC activity (Andrews, Clarke, Pell, & 
Hartley, 2010; Rajimehr, Devaney, Bilenko, Young, & Tootell, 2011), implying that its object-
related activation might be at least partially explained by different spatial properties of these 
stimuli, rather than by their semantic content. In the current study, all scenes were empirically 
tested for low-level visual differences between the conditions, including spatial frequencies, and 
no systematic difference was found between congruent and incongruent images (for details, see 
Mudrik et al., 2010), suggesting that the scenes differ mainly - if not exclusively - in contextual 
relations between the object and the scene in which it appears. Thus, our results go against low-
level accounts of PHC activity, and suggest that it more likely reflects associative processes. This 
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is in line with previous findings of PHC activations in response to objects which entail strong, as 
opposed to weak, contextual associations (Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Kveraga et al., 2011).  
Finally, our results strengthen the claim that the prefrontal cortex (PFC; more specifically 
here – the inferior frontal gyri (see also Gronau et al., 2008; Rémy et al., 2013) and the cingulate 
cortex (see again Gronau et al., 2008)) is involved in object-scene integration per se. Some have 
suggested that frontal activations recorded during the processing of incongruent scenes are task-
dependent (Rémy et al., 2013). Arguably, these activations arise since subjects need to inhibit the 
competing response induced by the scene’s gist (indeed, PFC activations - mostly in the right 
hemisphere - are found in response inhibition tasks; see Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; 
Garavan, Ross, Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002; Garavan, Ross, & Stein, 1999). Yet in our 
experiment, subjects were not asked to give any content-related responses, but simply to freely 
view the stimulus sequence and indicate how visible it was. In this passive viewing condition, we 
still found PFC activations - mainly in the inferior and middle frontal gyri - bilaterally, while 
response inhibition is held to be mediated by the right PFC (Garavan et al., 1999). Our results 
accord with previous studies which implicated the PFC in associative processing, for related and 
unrelated objects (Gronau et al., 2008), for objects which have strong contextual associations 
(Kveraga et al., 2011), for related and unrelated words (Gold et al., 2006) and for sentence 
endings that were either unrelated (e.g., Baumgaertner, Weiller, & Büchel, 2002; Kiehl, Laurens, 
& Liddle, 2002) or defied world-knowledge expectations (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & 
Petersson, 2004). In addition, increased mPFC connectivity with sensory areas has been found 
for congruent scenes which were better remembered than incongruent ones (van Kesteren et al., 
2010), suggesting that this area mediates contextual facilitation of congruent object processing, 
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and may be involved in extracting regularities across episodic experiences (Kroes & Fernández, 
2012; Schlichting & Preston, 2015). 
Taken together, our findings seem to support the model suggested by Bar (2004) for 
scene processing. According to this model, during normal scene perception the visual cortex 
projects a blurred, low spatial-frequency representation early and rapidly to the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) and parahippocampal cortex (PHC). This projection is considerably faster than the 
detailed parvocellular analysis, and presumably takes place in the magnocellular pathway 
(Graboi & Lisman, 2003; Merigan & Maunsell, 1993). In the PHC, this coarse information 
activates an experience-based prediction about the scene's context or its gist. Indeed, the gist of 
visual scenes can be extracted even with very short presentation durations of 13ms (Potter, 
Wyble, Hagmann, & McCourt, 2014; see also Joubert et al., 2005, though see Maguire & Howe, 
2016), and such fast processing is held to be based on global analysis of low-level features 
(Malcolm et al., 2016). Then, this schema is projected to the inferior temporal cortex (ITC), 
where a set of schema-congruent representations is activated so that representations of objects 
that are more strongly related to the schema are more activated, hereby facilitating their future 
identification. In parallel, the upcoming visual information of the target object selected by foveal 
vision and attention activates information in the PFC that subsequently sensitizes the most likely 
candidate interpretations of that individual object, irrespective of context (Bar & Aminoff, 2003). 
In the ITC, the intersection between the schema-congruent representations and the candidate 
interpretations of the target object results in the reliable selection of a single identity. For 
example, if the most likely object representations in PFC include a computer, a television set, 
and a microwave, and the most likely contextual representation in the PHC correspond to 
informatics, the computer alternative is selected in the ITC, and all other candidates are 
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suppressed. Then, further inspection allows refinement of this identity (for example, from a 
“computer" to a "laptop").  
Based on this model, we can now speculate about the mechanisms of incongruent scenes 
processing: in this case, the process should be prolonged and require additional analysis - as 
implied by the elevated activations in all three areas in our study in the incongruent condition. 
There, since the visual properties of the incongruent object generate different guesses about 
object-identities in the PFC than the schema-congruent representations subsequently activated in 
the ITC, the intersection fails to yield an identification of the object, requiring further inspection 
and a re-evaluation of both the extracted gist (PHC) and the possible object-guesses (PFC). This 
suggestion can explain the widely-reported disadvantage in identifying incongruent objects, both 
with respect to accuracy (e.g., Biederman et al., 1974; Boyce et al., 1989; Underwood, 2005) and 
to reaction times (e.g., Davenport & Potter, 2004; Palmer, 1975; Rieger et al., 2008). It is further 
strengthened by EEG findings, showing that the waveforms induced by congruent and 
incongruent scenes start to diverge in the N300 time window (200-300 ms after the scene had 
been presented) - if not earlier (Guillaume, Tinard, Baier, & Dufau, 2016), at which these 
matching procedures presumably take place, prior to object identification (Mudrik et al., 2010; 
Mudrik, Lamy, et al., 2014; Võ & Wolfe, 2013; though see Ganis & Kutas, 2003 and Demiral et 
al., 2012). Note however, that this model holds the ITC as the locus of object-context integration, 
at which the information from the PHC and PFC converge. It also focuses on the perceptual 
aspect of object-context integration, to explain how scene gist affects object identification. Yet 
PFC activations (more specifically, IFG activations) were found also for verbal stimuli that were 
either semantically anomalous or defied world-knowledge expectations (for review, see Hagoort, 
Baggio, & Willems, 2009), suggesting that (a) the PFC may also be involved in the integrative 
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process itself, rather than only in generating possible guesses about object identities irrespective 
of context and (b) that it may mediate a more general, amodal mechanism of integration and 
evaluation. 
 
4.2. The role of consciousness in object-context integration  
In this study, we found no neural evidence for unconscious object-context integration: using only 
trials in which subjects reported seeing nothing or only a glimpse of the stimulus, and were at 
chance in discriminating target image congruency (though slightly above chance in 
discriminating target image orientation), the BOLD activations found in the visible and localizer 
conditions became undetectable in our setup. Following previous studies which failed to find 
univariate effects during unconscious processing but managed to show significant decoding (e.g., 
Sterzer, Haynes, & Rees, 2008) we used multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA; Norman, Polyn, 
Detre, & Haxby, 2006) as a more sensitive way to detect neural activations which may subserve 
unconscious object-context integration; however, we did not find significant decoding in the 
invisible condition. 
How should this null result be interpreted? One possibility is that it reflects the brain’s 
inability to process the relations between an object and a scene when both are invisible. This 
finding goes against our original behavioral finding of differential suppression durations for 
congruent vs. incongruent scenes (Mudrik, Breska, et al., 2011; see also Mudrik & Koch, 2013); 
however, a recent study failed to replicate (Moors et al., 2016) this original finding, and we too 
were not able to reproduce behavioral evidence for unconscious scene-object integration (Kataev 
& Mudrik, under review). Furthermore, another study which focused on the processing of 
implied motion in real-life scenes also failed to find evidence of unconscious processing (Faivre 
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& Koch, 2014). In the same vein, the findings of another study which investigated high-level 
contextual unconscious integration of words into congruent and incongruent sentences (Sklar et 
al., 2012) was recently criticized (Shanks, 2016; for a review of studies showing different types 
of unconscious integration, see Mudrik et al., 2014). Taken together with the null result in our 
study, this could imply that high-level integration is actually not possible in the absence of 
awareness. This interpretation is in line with the prominent theories of consciousness which 
consider consciousness and integration to be intimately related (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; 
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001), if not equivalent to each other (Tononi et al., 2016; Tononi & 
Edelman, 1998). 
On the other hand, one should be cautious in interpreting the absence of evidence as 
evidence of absence. The observable correlates of unconscious integration processes may be so 
weak that we missed them; our study was likely underpowered both with respect to number of 
subjects and number of trials, and fMRI may simply not be a sensitive enough methodology to 
detect the weak effects of unconscious higher-level processing. The Bayesian analyses we 
performed suggest that our data in the invisible condition was inconclusive, and did not support 
the null hypothesis. Many previous fMRI studies either showed substantially reduced or no 
activations to invisible stimuli (Bahmani, Murayama, Logothetis, & Keliris, 2014; Hesselmann 
& Malach, 2011; Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 2013), or effects that were significant, yet weaker 
and more focused compared with conscious processing (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2001; Sadaghiani et 
al., 2010; Van Gaal, Lamme, Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2011). Together, this raises the 
possibility that in some cases behavioral measures may be more sensitive than imaging results; in 
a recent study, for example, invisible reward cues improved subjects’ performance to the same 
extent as visible ones - yet while the latter evoked activations in several brain regions (namely, 
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motor and premotor cortex and inferior parietal lobe), the former did not (Bijleveld et al., 2014). 
Critically, in that study subjects were performing a task while scanned. Our study, on the other 
hand, included no task in order to make sure that the observed activations were not task-induced, 
but rather represented object-context integration per se. Thus, while our findings cannot rule out 
the possibility that object-context integration indeed does not depend on conscious perception; 
they surely do not support this claim. 
 
Conclusions 
While finding no definite evidence for (or against) unconscious object-context integration, the 
present study contributes to our understanding of conscious object-context integration. We found 
enhanced LOC, ITC, PHC and PFC activations for incongruent scenes, irrespective of task 
requirements. Our results cannot be explained by low-level differences between the images, 
including spatial frequencies, which were suggested as a possible confound in previous studies 
(Rémy et al., 2013). The use of stimuli that depict people performing real-life actions with 
different objects, rather than non-ecological stimuli (e.g., line drawings; Kim & Biederman, 
2010; isolated, floating objects; Gronau et al., 2008; Kaiser et al., 2014), or stimuli with which 
subjects have less hands-on, everyday experience (animals or objects presented in natural vs. 
urban sceneries; Jenkins et al., 2010; Kirk, 2008; Rémy et al., 2013), enables us to better track 
real-life object-context integration processes which also occur outside the laboratory. Our results 
thus imply that in such real-life integration processes, incoming visual information about object 
features is compared with scene-congruent representations evoked by the scene gist, in an 
interplay between the abovementioned areas. This interplay - usually leading to contextual 
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facilitation of object processing - is disrupted when incongruent scenes are presented, resulting in 
additional neural processing to resolve these incongruencies. 
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Supplementary material 
 
 
Supplementary figure 1. Masks of t-maps for the comparison of baseline vs. stimulation 
(congruent and incongruent) trials in the visible condition (in red), and invisible condition 
(in yellow). p < 0.001, uncorrected. 
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Cluster size T-value (peak) P-value correction x y z  Anatomical region Broadmann area 
2365 8.47 < 0.001 FWE 57 -61 -11 Right Inferior Temporal Gyrus BA 37 
 
8.27  FWE 30 -55 49 Right Precuneus BA 7 
 
7.41  FWE 27 -70 40 Right Superior Parietal Lobule BA 7 
1215 7.81 < 0.001 FWE -42 2 34 Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus BA 9 
 
6.28  FWE -27 17 -2 Left Claustrum  
2538 7.72 < 0.001 FWE -33 -58 -11 Left Cerebellum  
 
7.11  FWE -48 -49 -14 Left Sub-Gyral BA 37 
 
7.03  FWE -36 -67 -5 Left Middle Occipital Gyrus BA 37 
347 5.74 0.001 FWE 48 14 34 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus BA 9 
 
4.51  FWE 57 35 19 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus BA 46 
143 4.98 0.033 FWE 0 -31 31 Left Cingulate Gyrus BA 23 
 
3.88 < 0.001 unc 0 -34 46 Left Paracentral Lobule BA 31 
55 4.41 < 0.001 unc -3 20 52 Left Medial Frontal Gyrus BA 8 
 
3.77 < 0.001 unc -12 23 67 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus BA 6 
45 4.26 < 0.001 unc 24 20 -14 Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus BA 47 
 
4.22 < 0.001 unc 21 35 -17 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus BA 11 
 
4.02 < 0.001 unc 39 32 -14 Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus BA 47 
15 4.14 < 0.001 unc 9 11 10 Right Caudate Caudate Body 
16 4.11 < 0.001 unc -9 35 28 Left Anterior Cingulate BA 32 
10 4 < 0.001 unc -9 -73 -35 Left Cerebellum  
19 3.93 < 0.001 unc 51 38 -2 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus BA 47 
 
 
Table 1.  
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 Cluster size T-value (peak) P-value correction x y z  Anatomical region Broadmann area 
4208 7.37 < 0.001 FWE 9 29 40 Right Medial Frontal Gyrus BA 6 
 
7.28  FWE -12 32 28 Left Anterior Cingulate BA 32 
 
6.87  FWE 39 14 34 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus BA 9 
258 7.01 0.001 FWE -3 -13 28 Left Cingulate Gyrus BA 23 
 
5.92  FWE -6 -25 31 Left Cingulate Gyrus BA 23 
 
5.5  FWE -3 -40 19 Left Posterior Cingulate BA 29 
143 6.9 0.022 FWE 48 -43 -17 Right Fusiform Gyrus BA 37 
 
4.63  FWE 54 -34 -17 Right Inferior Temporal Gyrus BA 20 
827 6.65 < 0.001 FWE 15 -64 40 Right Precuneus BA 7 
 
6.41  FWE -33 -49 40 Left Inferior Parietal Lobule BA 40 
 
4.58  FWE -27 -70 40 Left Precuneus BA 7 
344 5.7 < 0.001 FWE -42 -67 -8 Left Inferior Temporal Gyrus BA 37 
 
5.49  FWE -45 -52 -14 Left Fusiform Gyrus BA 37 
143 5.03 0.022 FWE 12 11 10 Right Caudate Caudate Body 
 
4.32  FWE 0 -16 4 Left Thalamus Medial Dorsal Nucleus 
 
3.98  FWE 9 -7 7 Right Thalamus Ventral Anterior Nucleus 
259 4.97 0.001 FWE 39 -79 34 Right Precuneus BA 19 
 
4.9 < 0.001 unc 42 -73 40 Right Precuneus BA 19 
 
4.78 < 0.001 unc 39 -67 46 Right Inferior Parietal Lobule BA 7 
52 4.83 < 0.001 unc -12 8 10 Left Caudate Caudate Body 
29 4.62 < 0.001 unc 39 53 25 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus BA 10 
16 4.22 < 0.001 unc -33 -94 1 Left Middle Occipital Gyrus BA 18 
 
3.64 < 0.001 unc -39 -91 7 Left Middle Occipital Gyrus BA 18 
10 3.75 < 0.001 unc -60 -49 19 Left Supramarginal Gyrus BA 40 
 
Table 2. 
 
decoding performance global null p-value majority null p-value log Bayes Factor x y z Region of Interest Broadmann area 
53.8 0.026 0.14 0.95 48 -55 -17 Right Fusiform Gyrus BA 37 
55.6 0.043 0.73 0.65 27 -70 40 Right Superior Parietal Lobule BA 7 
54.9 0.039 0.3 0.7 -42 2 34 Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus BA 9 
55 0.045 0.74 0.61 -27 -49 46 Left Precuneus BA 7 
55.9 0.017 0.05 1.24 -36 20 25 Middle Frontal Gyrus BA 9 
56.8 0.002 0.05 2.64 -45 8 28 Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus BA 9 
56.8 0.017 0.86 1.23 -27 17 -2 Left Claustrum  
56.8 0.021 0.31 1.09 -3 20 52 Left Medial Frontal Gyrus BA 8 
57.1 0.006 0.31 2.01 -12 23 67 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus BA 6 
54.9 0.003 0.13 2.35 24 20 -14 Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus BA 47 
54.9 0.012 0.13 1.5 39 32 -14 Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus BA 47 
58.7 0.001 0.13 4.94 -9 35 28 Left Anterior Cingulate BA 32 
 
Table 3. 
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